— Let's start with an easily predictable question. 15 years have passed since Tagliavini's report, how would you assess its legacy and importance today?

— The report was based on information available at the time of its preparation, that is, 15 years ago. It brought transparency to a dark chapter in the history of Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it set new international standards in the fields of international law, humanitarian law and human rights and defused highly charged tensions both in Georgia and abroad. Moreover, most importantly, the report was accepted by both parties, the Russian Federation and Georgia, and is still referred to today, 15 years later.

— In the same way, I’ll ask you about the legacy and importance of the 2008 war: after 15 years, has your view of it changed? How do you evaluate what happened today when you know how events developed after that?

— From today’s perspective, I would say that the August 2008 war in Georgia was a bit like a dress rehearsal for what was to happen later in Ukraine. Looking back, I think the report has aged very well and remains relevant, especially in the legal field. As I already noted, it set international standards. Let me give you a few examples. For example, it examines in detail the legal status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and dwells in detail on the right to self-determination and secession. There, for the first time, another important issue is discussed - the so-called passportization. In addition, of course, the most important chapter is about the use of force: who had the right to use it? After a detailed investigation, we concluded that no one, not a single party.

— 15 years is quite a long time. Is there anything in the report that you look at differently today and perhaps would like to change? Corrections, new information that may have emerged since then...

- I’ll tell you straight, no. I would not change anything, no changes or new conclusions. The text is still valid and relevant. The only thing I would probably note today is that the conclusions that we should have drawn from the report were not taken into account. In 2009, some countries, especially those in Eastern Europe, warned the European Union who would be next. This warning was not heeded. When the war ended and peace came, what usually happens in politics happened - relations resumed. This is normal political practice.

— When the report was published, the already heated information war reached its boiling point. It is believed that both sides tried their best to use the report as a tool to prove that they were the ones who were right in this conflict. Who do you think did it? Who won and lost according to Tagliavini's report? Or rather, who benefited most from it?

- When the report was published, I said that there were no winners in this war. Today I might be more cautious, since it seems that in the end Russia was the only winner, everyone else was a loser.
However, while working on the report, we dealt with a huge, uncontrollable cloud of
speculation, and ultimately concluded: you cannot stop people from writing what they want,
despite the facts, but you can minimize it.
The European Union initiated the report - it was the concern of the European Union, Europe, European citizens, they wanted to find out what happened in August 2008 Speculation around the report was observed mainly in Georgia and Russia; no questions arose in Europe.

— It’s one thing who won and who lost, but let’s delve into the second part of the question - despite your efforts to remain as neutral as possible, who benefited more from Tagliavini’s report in the information war?

— It is hard for me to say, I do not live either in Georgia or in Russia.

— I mean, who was able to shape international public opinion in their favor?

- I will say this: I believe that if today someone decides to delve into the topic of the August
2008 war in Georgia, he will not be able to bypass our report; he will rely on this document.
There may be different speculations - you understand, history is quite flexible. Of course, there will be such attempts, but if you have to submit an expert opinion, you will give preference to a report or text that is approved by an international organization such as the European Union. The report is given weight by the fact that both Georgia and Russia recognize it.

— That’s all true, but the Georgian side still believes that Russia benefited more from this report, because of the wording. Already in the third paragraph, the impression was that the report accused Georgia of starting the war. How valid is this argument?

- This is a kind of Rubicon - the issue of the bombing of Tskhinval. We worked hard on the
wording; in the report we called it the beginning of a large-scale armed conflict, but it was only the culmination of a long period of increasing tension, provocations and incidents. I think this formulation was correct. I myself worked for five years in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and such periods of tension were not uncommon, but a constant occurrence, in 2008 more on the South Ossetian side - every summer we noted that clashes of a larger or smaller scale took place in South Ossetia.

Collisions are one thing. The problem is when can we say that clashes have escalated into war, at what point? This moment became a trigger and a headache for the Georgian side, a trigger for the invasion of Russian troops, who from a legal point of view had the right to liberate their peacekeepers. This was the only force that had the right to come in to help the peacekeepers:they were supposed to leave immediately after this, rather than invade Georgia.

Unfortunately, from a legal point of view, the shelling of Tskhinval became the trigger that led to a full-scale invasion. Now we can speculate a lot about what would have happened if Tskhinval had not come under fire that night of August 7-8. Nevertheless, it was a key trigger, and so we could not describe it any other way.

— As for the Russian peacekeepers, to what extent can their actions be assessed as
peacekeeping in South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

- Let me refer you to that part of our report called “Observations.” We did not draw conclusions, they were observations, and one of the most important observations is when we say that no party to the conflict or a party that strongly supports any of the parties should take the position of peacemaker, because peacekeeping is based on impartiality. I don't think we could have said it better.

— But doesn’t this question the legitimacy of Russian peacekeepers? If they have become a biased party, which, as the Georgian side claims, actively helped the armed forces of South Ossetia and the Abkhazians, then how appropriate is it to call them peacemakers? Accordingly, how valid is the argument presented in the report that if the Georgian side opened fire on Russian peacekeepers, Russia had the right to invade and rescue them?

- No, no, no, you are thinking wrongly. From a legal point of view, if your peacekeepers are in another country, Georgia, regardless of whether there are questions about their neutrality or not, Russia had the right to save and protect them, the right to withdraw its peacekeepers from the country.

— Even when these peacekeepers themselves became a party to the conflict?

- From a legal point of view, you can’t say so. The report also acknowledges that Russian non-peacekeeping forces were also present in Georgia, but this was not a massive presence and therefore could not be classified as a Russian invasion.

— Forgive me for the ironic question, but if even one Russian tank or soldier crossed the Swiss border, would your country consider it an invasion and an act of aggression?

- Don't compare apples with oranges. We told you everything in our report. We did not receive any document from the Georgian side that would confirm there was at least one tank in South Ossetia that did not belong to the peacekeepers. Therefore, I think this question should be asked to the then Georgian authorities. We requested documents, but what we received did not confirm 100% that this happened. Lawyers work with absolute, 100% evidence, and we have not been able to achieve 100% clarity on this issue.

- It's clear. Let's return to the original question - by that time in the West there was a kind of dogma, a mantra, according to which, no matter what happened, it was necessary to maintain certain ties with Russia, since the West did not have the luxury of having an open enemy in Russia. Do you think this dogma or sentiment influenced your reporting as well?

- No, not. We had the mandate of an independent international fact-finding mission, and I can say with complete confidence that no one ever interfered in our activities, no one gave us instructions, we had complete independence, the only condition was that we take full
responsibility for what they did and wrote in the report.One of the goals at the time, in 2008-2009, was to gain more clarity about what actually happened. There was a cloud of propaganda surrounding the conflict and there was no clear understanding within the European Union of what we were dealing with. I was told directly: the purpose of the investigation is to understand how to renew relations with Russia and Georgia. The goal was to step back, look at what happened, see what we could figure out, and then, after the report came out, decide how to continue the relationship. Because after the war, you cannot continue everyday relationships pretending that nothing happened. This was the main purpose of the report.

- To sum up, the main conclusion of the report was that some blame for what happened could be put on all parties involved. Is this a correct assessment?

- No, I would say only partially. All parties made mistakes in the legal field. As I already said,
passportization is considered to be contrary to international law, and, at a minimum, an
unfriendly step towards a neighbor, support for separatism, as we called it, does not contribute to peaceful coexistence. There are many other facts that could be cited. If you read the entire legal section, it says enough about where the conflict can go and that it can be triggered by a side event. Nevertheless, the responsibility is shared.
We also said that claims that the Georgian side had committed genocide were unfounded: we could find no evidence of genocide, but we found evidence of ethnic cleansing committed by South Ossetians and that Russian peacekeepers or Russian soldiers did not prevent it.

— I don’t know if you’ve seen Putin’s video, dated, if I’m not mistaken, 2015, in which he openly says that the so-called “Georgian operation” was approved by Moscow back in 2007 Against this background and against the background of what then happened in Ukraine, all this division of responsibility between the parties that is contained in your report, doesn’t this seem like an empty gesture to you?